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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: A large power plant hires a
global construction firm to produce eight reactors designed to
remove toxic pollutants from exhaust that the plant releases into
the atmosphere. The reactors are large and extremely complicated pieces of machinery, so the construction company subcontracts
the manufacturing and installation of their internal components
to multiple different subcontractors. Shortly after the power
plant puts three of the reactors into operation, plant supervisors
discover cracking and fracturing in the reactors caused by a
defect in an internal gas riser manufactured by a subcontractor.
The damage to those reactors is so severe that they must be
completely replaced. And while the plant has not begun operating the other five reactors, the construction company already
installed the same faulty gas riser in them. Workers cannot replace the faulty gas risers in the tight confines of the reactors
without damaging them.
The construction company incurs over $200 million in costs
repairing the reactors for the power plant. Luckily, they procured
commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance to cover their
work on the reactors before they began the project. A payout
within the limits of the policy would indemnify them for a great
deal of the repair costs. But the insurance company refuses to
pay, claiming that the damage to the reactors is not covered
under the CGL policy. First, they insist that the damage to the
reactors is not a coverable occurrence as defined in the policy
because it was caused by the subcontractor’s faulty work, and
faulty work is foreseeable. Second, they argue that even if it was
†
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an “occurrence,” the damage is not coverable under the policy
because it occurred to the work that was the subject of the
construction contract and not to the property of a third party as
defined in the policy.
This exact factual scenario is the subject of Black & Veatch
Corp. v. Aspen Insurance (U.K.) Ltd.1 There, the Tenth Circuit
held that under New York law, faulty subcontractor work can be
a coverable occurrence under a standard form CGL policy, and
the faulty gas riser installation at issue was such an occurrence.2
The court also found that the damage to the reactors was
property damage as defined in the CGL policy, and therefore the
company was entitled to indemnification for the cost of repairing
that damage.3 If this decision is indicative of how the New York
Court of Appeals would rule, then New York will join the
“overwhelming trend” of state supreme courts that recognize
faulty work as an occurrence.4
CGL coverage for faulty subcontractor work is important for
two reasons. First, denying contractors indemnification for damages caused by faulty subcontractor work would force them to
“ha[ve] a supervisor at the elbow of each subcontractor at all
times,” which would be “prohibitively expensive” unless they
passed that cost onto their customers.5 Second, unsophisticated
consumers may expect the CGL policies they purchase with
hard-earned money to cover faulty work by their subcontractors,
only to get burned when that very contingency occurs. While a
multinational engineering firm like Black & Veatch may have inhouse counsel to peruse insurance contracts, the neighborhood
contractor has neither the sophistication nor the bargaining power to negotiate for provisions in the insurer’s form contract.
Even if faulty work is considered a coverable occurrence, yet
another issue arises: Should that coverage include indemnification for the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty work itself,
or merely for damage to other property caused by that faulty
work? The court in Black & Veatch Corp. did not have occasion
to answer this question because the policy at issue defined cov-

1

882 F.3d 952, 954–56 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 151 (2018).
Id. at 971.
3
Id. at 963–64.
4
Id. at 971.
5
U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 890 (Fla. 2007) (quoting 2
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 14.13[D], at 14-224.8
(3d ed. Supp. 2007)).
2
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erable property damage as damage to the property of a third
party.6 The court concluded that the reactors belonged to the
power plant, which was a third party under the terms of the
policy.7 Therefore, all of the damage was coverable under the
policy, including the cost of repairing and replacing the reactors
that had been assembled with the faulty gas risers but had not
yet been put into operation.8 Nonetheless, this question is an important one because contractors who expect to be indemnified for
damage caused to other property by faulty subcontractor work
may also expect to be indemnified for the cost of repairing and
replacing the faulty work itself, since both result from the accidental error of a subcontractor. While a majority of states recognize faulty work as an occurrence, only a handful of those
states consider the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty
work itself to be coverable property damage under standard form
CGL policies.9
In October of 2018, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
faulty subcontractor work was not a coverable occurrence under
standard form CGL policies in an extraordinary “spurning”10 of
the national trend.11 As this Note discusses below, the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s holding was based on precedent that applied a
flawed understanding of CGL policies to the issue of faulty work.
Fortunately, the New York Court of Appeals is not bound by
similar precedent.12
In the face of urgency created by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s decision, this Note argues that the New York Court of Appeals should hold that faulty work is a coverable occurrence
under standard form CGL policies, and the cost of repairing and
replacing the faulty work itself is coverable “property damage.”
Part I of this Note defines standard form CGL policy language,
such as “occurrence,” “property damage,” and “accident.” Part I
also explores relevant exclusions that limit coverage and the

6

Id.
Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 963–64.
8
See id.
9
See Christopher C. French, Revisiting Construction Defects as “Occurrences”
Under CGL Insurance Policies, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 101, 126, 128–29 (2016).
10
Jeff Sistrunk, Ohio Justices Say Bad Subcontractor Work Not an “Accident,”
LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1090223 [https://perma.cc/
VXD5-XVZD].
11
Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 155 Ohio St. 3d 197, 2018-Ohio4057, 120 N.E.3d 762, at ¶ 3.
12
See infra Part II.
7
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exceptions to those exclusions. Part II discusses New York law
with respect to CGL policies, starting with a brief analysis of the
doctrines of policy interpretation, followed by an analysis of the
leading New York intermediate appellate court case, which holds
that faulty work is not an occurrence. Part II then contrasts that
case with the Black & Veatch Corp. holding.
Part III discusses a scholarly approach to CGL policy interpretation referenced by the court in Black & Veatch Corp. The
thesis is that faulty work should always be considered an
occurrence unless it is subjectively expected or intended by the
insured. Part III then discusses cases from other states’ highest
courts that apply a similar subjective standard and contrasts
those cases with the Supreme Court of Ohio’s recent decision in
Ohio Northern University, which applied a more objective standard. Part IV discusses an issue not raised in Black & Veatch
Corp.—namely, whether the cost of repairing and replacing the
faulty work itself is coverable property damage under standard
form CGL policies.
Finally, Part V makes the case that the New York Court of
Appeals should hold that faulty subcontractor work is a coverable
occurrence under standard form CGL policies. First, Part V concludes that the Black & Veatch Corp. court correctly distinguished
the leading New York intermediate appellate court case based on
its facts and a major difference in the CGL policy at issue. Second, Part V argues that the New York Court of Appeals should
adopt a subjective standard rather than an objective standard
like the one applied by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Last, Part V
contends that the New York Court of Appeals should also hold
that the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty work itself is
included in the definition of coverable “property damage” under
standard form CGL policies.
I. STANDARD FORM CGL POLICY LANGUAGE
The standard form CGL policy issued by the Insurance Services Office (“ISO”)13 since 201314 employs a three-part structure:
13

The Insurance Services Office is the primary developer of standard CGL policy forms for state insurance regulators in the United States. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (“[The] ISO develops standard policy forms
and files or lodges them with each State’s insurance regulators; most CGL insurance
written in the United States is written on these forms.”). The standard form policy
can then be tailored to the needs of the insurer or insured by way of “endorsements”
that amend the policy language. Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 958 (“[The] ISO
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(a) the basic insuring agreement determines initial coverage, (b) the
various exclusions narrow the scope of coverage, and (c) the various exceptions to those exclusions restore coverage.15
A.

Initial Coverage Under CGL Policies and Definitions of
Relevant Policy Language

The standard form policy provides the following basic insuring agreement language:
SECTION I—COVERAGES
COVERAGE A—BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . “property
damage” to which this insurance applies. . . .
b. This insurance applies to . . .“property damage” only if:
(1) The . . . “property damage” is caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory” . . . .16

Under the basic agreement, “the insurer agrees to pay those
sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . property damage . . . caused by an occurrence
that takes place in the coverage territory.”17 This essentially imposes a dual requirement for coverage. There must be: (1) property
damage, and (2) an occurrence.

maintains a large portfolio of ‘endorsements,’ language that can be used to amend a
standard CGL policy to suit the needs of the insured or insurer” (citation omitted)).
14
The ISO has instituted several major revisions in the standard form CGL
policies it has issued since 1940. Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 959–60. The
most recent was in 2013. See Laurie Infantino, ISO Form Changes Commercial
General Liability, INSURANCE THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (Mar. 19, 2013),
https://www.insurancethoughtleadership.com/iso-form-changes-commercial-generalliability/ [https://perma.cc/EBM3-YZNV]. This Note discusses the most relevant
changes for faulty work jurisprudence. See infra Section I.B.
15
Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 958 (“The basic insuring agreement is then
subject to exclusions, which narrow the scope of coverage. The exclusions are then
subject to exceptions, which restore coverage—but only to the extent coverage was
initially included in the basic insuring agreement.”).
16
Ins. Servs. Off., Inc., Form No. CG 00 02 04 13, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form (2013) [hereinafter Coverage Form (2013)], reprinted in DONALD S.
MALECKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE GUIDE 549, 549 (12th
ed. 2017).
17
MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 1.
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There are two kinds of “property damage.” The first is
“[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss
of use of that property.”18 For this kind of property damage, “[a]ll
such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the
physical injury that caused it.”19 The second is “[l]oss of use of
tangible property that is not physically injured.”20 For the second
kind of property damage, “[a]ll such loss of use shall be deemed
to occur at the time of the ‘occurrence’ that caused it.”21 Notably,
neither kind distinguishes between tangible property that is the
subject of the insured’s own work and tangible property that is
owned by a third party—both simply encompass tangible property.22 Moreover, both kinds encompass loss of use of tangible
property, differentiated by its cause; the former covers loss of use
caused by physical injury, while the latter covers loss of use that
is simply caused by an “occurrence.”
An “[o]ccurrence,” the second requirement for coverage, is
defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”23
Modern standard form CGL policies do not define the term accident, but exclude “ ‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property damage’ expected
or intended from the standpoint of the insured” from coverage.24
18

Coverage Form (2013), supra note 16, at 565.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See French, supra note 9, at 105 (“Notably, the definition does not make a
distinction between property that is created by the contractor/policyholder (i.e., the
contractor’s workmanship) and separate property owned by a third party . . . .”).
23
Coverage Form (2013), supra note 16, at 564.
24
Id. at 549. The definition of “occurrence” in modern CGL forms differs from
the definition given in the 1973 ISO form, which defined “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured.” Ins. Servs. Off., Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance Coverage Form (1973) [hereinafter Coverage Form
(1973)], reprinted in MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 489 (emphasis added); see
also French, supra note 9, at 105-06. The “expected or intended” language was
moved to the exclusions section in the ISO’s 1986 policy revision, but the change was
not intended to affect the requirement that an “occurrence” must be fortuitous.
MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 7 (“Despite the change in the wording of the
occurrence definition, the effect is intended to be the same as in the 1973 policy.
Thus, whether it can be said that bodily injury or property damage is caused by an
occurrence still hinges on fortuity.”). The “continuous or repeated exposure” language means that the definition of occurrence is not limited to a single event but
encompasses gradual exposure. Id. at 404 (“[T]he phrase ‘continuous or repeated
exposure’ eliminates the necessity of proving the exact moment at which damage is
sustained.”).
19
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The effect of this language is to provide coverage for “property
damage” the insured did not expect or intend to be caused by
their actions, whether their actions alone were intentional or not.
B. The Business Risk Exclusions from Coverage Under CGL
Policies
The initial coverage provided under the basic insuring
agreement is then limited by several exclusions. Traditionally,
insurers do not cover “business risk[s],” such as liability for the
insured’s breach of implied or express contractual warranties
that the insured’s work will be performed according to particular
specifications.25 Numerous kinds of business risks are excluded
from coverage under standard form CGL policies.26 The most
relevant exclusion in the contracting context is “Exclusion L,” or
the “Your Work”27 exclusion, which provides that the insurance
does not apply to:
l. Damage To Your Work
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any
part of it and included in the “products-completed operations
hazard.”
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the
work out of which the damage arises was performed on your
behalf by a subcontractor.28

A brief discussion of the history and development of the “Your
Work” exclusion in ISO policies is instructive as to its meaning.
The 1973 ISO policy excluded coverage for “property damage to
work performed by or on behalf of the named insured arising out
of the work or any portion thereof.”29 The language “or on behalf
of the named insured” served to exclude coverage for damage to
the insured’s own work even if it was caused by someone working
on behalf of the insured—that is, a subcontractor. This provision
in the 1973 policy reflected that property damage to the insured’s
own work caused by faulty work was an inherent risk in the

25

MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 384.
Id.
27
Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Ins. (U.K.) Ltd., 882 F.3d 952, 958 (10th Cir.
2018) (“For consistency, we refer to this provision as the ‘Your Work’ exclusion.”),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 151 (2018).
28
Coverage Form (2013), supra note 16, at 553.
29
Coverage Form (1973), supra note 24, at 492.
26
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construction business and thereby was excluded from coverage,
even if the faulty work was performed by a subcontractor.30
Contractors began to subcontract work more often, and by
1976, the ISO responded to pressure from the industry by removing the phrase “or on behalf of” from the “Your Work” exclusion, thereby restoring coverage for damage to the insured’s
own work caused by a subcontractor.31 In 1986, the ISO clarified
the “Your Work” exclusion by adding language that explicitly
excepted subcontractor work.32 The effect of this language is to
designate the insured and the subcontractor as separate entities
under the “Your Work” exclusion, and provide that the insured
will not be held liable for the subcontractor’s faulty work.33

30
Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 959 (“[S]ubcontractor-caused damage was
considered a risk inherent to the construction business and explicitly excluded from
coverage in CGL policies.”).
31
STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 9A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 129:19 (3d ed. 2019) (“[M]any
general contractors were not satisfied with the lack of coverage . . . . In 1976, the insurance industry responded by the introduction of the Broad Form Property Damage
Endorsement, which extended coverage to insureds for property damage caused by
the work of their subcontractors.” (citing Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc.,
2004 WI 2, ¶¶ 67–68, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65)). See also Black & Veatch Corp.,
882 F.3d at 959 (“In response, the 1976 standard-form CGL policy eliminated the
phrase ‘or on behalf of ’ from the ‘Your Work’ exclusion. The policy thus broadened
coverage by no longer excluding damages arising from faulty subcontractor work.”).
32
PLITT ET AL., supra note 31 (“The subcontractor exception to . . . ‘your work’
was added directly to the body of the policy in 1986.” (citing Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co.,
2004 WI 2, ¶¶ 67–68)). See also Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 959 (“In 1986, the
ISO attempted to clear up this confusion by expressly stating in the standard-form
CGL policy that the ‘Your Work’ exclusion does not apply ‘if the damaged work . . .
was performed . . . by a subcontractor.’ ” (alterations in original)). The ISO explicitly
stated in a contemporaneous circular that the revision to the “Your Work” exclusion
was intended to provide coverage for “damage to, or caused by, a subcontractor’s
work.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Commercial General Liability Program
Instructions Pamphlet Furnished, CIRCULAR NO. GL-86-204 (Ins. Servs. Office, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.), July 15, 1986); see also Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n v. Adria
Towers, L.L.C., 143 A.3d 273, 282 (N.J. 2016) (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B.,
Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 (Fla. 2007)).
33
MALECKI ET AL., supra note 16, at 76–77.
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II. NEW YORK LAW
A.

Doctrines of Policy Interpretation34

New York courts apply three doctrines of policy interpretation: (1) contra proferentem,35 (2) the reasonable expectations doctrine,36 and (3) a doctrine requiring that courts construe the
policy as a whole.37
1.

Contra Proferentem

The doctrine of contra proferentem provides that any ambiguities in the policy language should be interpreted “in favor of
coverage” and “against the insurers,” even if both parties offer
“reasonable interpretations” of the ambiguous language.38 The
rationale for this doctrine is that the insurer is in the best
position to resolve ambiguities in the policy language because the
insurer creates the policy.39
2.

Reasonable Expectations Doctrine

The reasonable expectations doctrine provides that the “objectively reasonable expectations” of the consumer in purchasing
insurance must be protected, even if the policy provisions
“negate[ ] those expectations.”40 The rationale for this doctrine is
similar to the rationale for contra proferentem. Purchasers of insurance are unlikely to have the level of sophistication necessary
to interpret ambiguities in the policy; therefore, the insurer is
obligated to make sure the policy coverage meets the purchaser’s

34
These are universal policies of insurance contract interpretation applied by
courts around the country. See French, supra note 9, at 109 (“When courts are asked
to interpret and apply policy language, such as the definitions of ‘occurrence’ and
‘property damage,’ there are three well-established rules of policy interpretation that
are particularly relevant: (1) contra proferentem, (2) the ‘reasonable expectations’
doctrine, and (3) construction of the policy as a whole.”).
35
1 ROBERT D. GOODMAN & STEVE VACCARO, NEW APPLEMAN NEW YORK
INSURANCE LAW § 15.02 n.6 (2d ed. 2020) (collecting New York intermediate appellate court cases and federal district court cases applying New York law).
36
Id. nn.3–4 (collecting cases).
37
See Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 960–61.
38
French, supra note 9, at 109 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 206 (AM. L. INST. 1981)).
39
See id. at 109–10, 109 n.20.
40
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
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expectations when purchasing the policy, and any misinterpretations are weighed against the insurer.41
3.

Construing the Policy as a Whole

Finally, courts construe insurance policies such that all of
the policy language is afforded a “fair meaning,” and “no provision”
is left “without force or effect.”42 In other words, no provision of
the policy should be read in isolation, and coverage should be
interpreted by reading all of the policy provisions together.43
B. New York Cases Interpreting “Occurrence”
1.

George A. Fuller Co. v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co.:
The Leading New York Case on Faulty Work Coverage

The New York Court of Appeals has not yet decided whether
faulty work is an occurrence under standard form CGL policies.44
The leading intermediate appellate court case is George A. Fuller
Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,45 decided by the
New York Appellate Division, First Department, in 1994.46 There,
the court held that a contractor was not entitled to indemnification for liability incurred due to faulty work.47
In Fuller, a building owner hired the George A. Fuller Company (“Fuller”) to manage the construction of a mixed commercial
and residential building in Manhattan.48 The contractor retained
a subcontractor to install wood flooring, an aluminum wall, and a
41

Id. at 969.
Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 960–61 (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 21 N.Y.3d 139, 148 (N.Y. 2013)).
43
French, supra note 9, at 112.
44
See Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 956–57.
45
This Note regards Fuller as the leading Appellate Division case for three
reasons. First, Aspen’s lawyers in Black & Veatch “rel[ied] heavily” on Fuller. Id. at
957. Second, the court itself pointed out that the other relevant appellate cases
offered by Aspen either relied solely on Fuller, cited to other cases that relied on
Fuller, or cited as persuasive Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979),
a New Jersey Supreme Court case that was “effectively overturned” in Cypress Point
Condominium Ass’n v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., 143 A.3d 273 (N.J. 2016). Black &
Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 969–70. Third, other scholars have treated Fuller as the
leading Appellate Division case as well. See, e.g., Qifu Li, Note, What America Can
Learn from Canada’s Progressive Decision in Commercial General Liability Policy
Coverage Litigation over Construction Defects, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.
165, 166 (2014) (citing Fuller for the proposition that “New York’s case law holds
that construction defects are not occurrences within CGL policies”).
46
200 A.D.2d 255, 255 (1st Dep’t 1994).
47
Id. at 261–62.
48
Id. at 257.
42
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water system that complied with the city code.49 Fuller procured
a CGL policy for the project through United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Company (“USF&G”).50 The policy insured Fuller for
“ ‘property damage’ . . . caused by an ‘occurrence,’ which [the
policy] defined as ‘an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.’ ”51 The policy further excluded two kinds of damage:
(1) property damage to “[t]hat particular part of real property on
which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly
or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations if the
‘property damage’ arises out of those operations”; and, (2) property damage to “[t]hat particular part of any property that must be
restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly
performed on it,” where “your work” was defined as “[w]ork or
operations performed by you or on your behalf.”52 Therefore, the
question arose as to whether the latter exclusion precluded coverage for damage to the contracted work caused by the contractor’s
own negligent construction.
The subcontractor’s negligent installation caused the wood
flooring to buckle and allowed “water infiltration into the
building” through the aluminum wall.53 As a result of the water
damage, the water metering system had to be repaired.54 The
building owner sued Fuller on various counts, and Fuller sought
indemnification from USF&G, who ultimately denied coverage
for the claim on the grounds that the damage was not an “occurrence” as defined in the policy.55 Fuller sought a declaration that
USF&G was liable to defend Fuller in the underlying suit per the
terms of the contract.56 The lower court granted Fuller’s cross
motion for summary judgement, finding the water infiltration
was continuous exposure to a generally harmful condition, which
tracked the definition for occurrence under the policy.57
The Appellate Division reversed.58 The court found Fuller’s
faulty work was not an accident resulting in “continuous or re49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See id.
Id. at 256–57.
Id.
Id. at 257 (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 261–62.
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peated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions” because it was the result of “intentional cost-saving or
negligent acts” which only affected the building owner’s “economic interest in the building.”59 The court insisted that Fuller’s
“contract default” was not an accident simply because Fuller alleged negligence.60 Therefore, the court found no occurrence under the policy.61
Nonetheless, the court found that even if Fuller’s faulty work
were an occurrence, the policy expressly excluded from coverage
damage to the contractor’s work.62 The court maintained that the
CGL policy issued by USF&G “d[id] not insure against faulty
workmanship in the work product itself but rather faulty workmanship in the work product which creates a legal liability by
causing bodily injury or property damage to something other
than the work product.”63 In the court’s view, the CGL policy “was
never intended to insure Fuller’s work product or Fuller’s compliance . . . with its contractual obligations,” and to hold otherwise “would transform USF&G into a surety for the performance
of Fuller’s work.”64 Therefore, the court held that Fuller was not
entitled to indemnification.65
2.

Black & Veatch Corp.: Refusing to Extend Fuller

In Black & Veatch Corp., the lawyers for Aspen Insurance
“relie[d] heavily” on Fuller, arguing that the Appellate Division’s
refusal to extend CGL coverage beyond faulty workmanship in
the work product which causes property damage to something
other than the work product necessarily precluded faulty work
from being a coverable occurrence under New York law.66 Nonetheless, the court distinguished Fuller based on differences in the
CGL policy at issue and the facts of the case.67
The contractor Black & Veatch (“B&V”) purchased the CGL
policy at issue through Aspen Insurance (“Aspen”).68 The policy

59

Id. at 259.
Id. at 259–60.
61
Id. at 259.
62
Id. at 260.
63
Id. at 259.
64
Id. at 260.
65
Id. at 261–62.
66
Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Ins. (U.K.) Ltd., 882 F.3d 952, 967–68 (10th
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 151 (2018).
67
Id. at 967–69.
68
Id. at 955.
60
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provided coverage for “ ‘Property Damage’ . . . caused by an ‘Occurrence.’ ”69 The contractor Black & Veatch (“B&V”) purchased
the CGL policy at issue through Aspen Insurance (“Aspen”). The
policy contained the following definitions:
• Occurrence: “an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, that results in . . . ‘Property Damage’ that is not
expected or not intended by the ‘Insured.’ ”
• Property Damage: “physical injury to tangible property of a
‘Third Party,’ including all resulting loss of use of that property of a ‘Third Party’ . . . .”
• Third Party: “any . . . entity . . . other than an ‘Insured.’ ”70

Additionally, the policy defined an “Insured” as “any entity listed
as a ‘Named Insured’ or designated as an ‘Additional Insured.’ ”71
The policy further excluded coverage for “ ‘Property Damage’ to
‘Your Work,’ ” where “ ‘Your Work’ is defined as ‘work operations
performed by you or on your behalf’ by a subcontractor.”72 Finally, the policy included an exception to that exclusion, providing
that the exclusion “does not apply if the damaged work or the
work out of which the damage arises was performed on [B&V’s]
behalf by a subcontractor.”73 The question thus arose as to whether that exception to the exclusion allowed coverage for the
subcontractor’s faulty work.
The court found that B&V was entitled to indemnification for
four main reasons. First, the damage to the reactors was an occurrence under the policy and qualified as coverable property
damage.74 Second, the subcontractor exception to the “Your
Work” exclusion was added by the ISO specifically to preserve
coverage for faulty work performed by subcontractors.75 Third,
the overwhelming trend of state supreme courts around the country was to hold that faulty work can constitute an occurrence,
and that contractors are covered for unexpected damage caused
by subcontractor work.76 Fourth, Fuller did not compel a conclusion

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 963.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 956 (alteration in original).
Id. at 965.
Id. at 959–60.
Id. at 966 (citing French, supra note 9, at 122–23).
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in favor of the insurance provider because it was distinguishable
on its facts.77
As to the first reason, the court found that the damage to the
reactors was an occurrence under the policy because it was
caused by an accident.78 B&V neither expected nor intended for
their subcontractors to perform faulty work, nor did they engage
in reckless cost-cutting like the contractor in Fuller.79 The court
rejected Aspen’s argument and concluded that the damage was
coverable “property damage” under the policy because the plant
owner was a third party, not an additional insured under the
policy.80 The court concluded instead that the plant owner was
an additional insured only for liability “arising out of operations
performed by the Named Insured,” but the subcontractor who
performed the work at issue was not a named insured under the
policy.81
The court bolstered its finding that faulty subcontractor
work was an occurrence under the policy by concluding that the
definition of occurrence would not make sense when construed
along with the business risk exclusions unless the definition
included faulty work.82 The court found that reading the definition of occurrence to exclude the damage to B&V’s work product
would render the “Your Work” exclusion and the subcontractor
exception to that exclusion superfluous, in violation of New York
law.83 According to the court’s reasoning, the provision excluding
coverage for damage to the insured’s own work necessarily
implied that those damages were not “categorically and preemptively preclude[d]” by “the definition of “occurrence’ ”; otherwise,
the exclusion would be surplusage.84 Moreover, the policy would
not provide an exception to the “Your Work” exclusion for work
performed by a subcontractor unless faulty work was a coverable
occurrence under the policy to begin with.85 For these reasons,
the court rejected Aspen’s argument that the subcontractor ex77

Id. at 968–69.
Id. at 962–63.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 963–64.
81
Id. at 963.
82
Id. at 964–65.
83
Id. at 964 (“CGL policies [must] be construed ‘in a way that affords a fair
meaning to all of the language . . . in the contract and leaves no provision without
force and effect.’ ”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 21 N.Y.3d 139, 148 (N.Y. 2013))).
84
Id.
85
Id.
78
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ception impermissibly creates coverage for damage that is not a
coverable occurrence under the basic insuring agreement, and
held that the damage to the reactors was an occurrence.86
As noted above, the court held that Fuller did not compel a
conclusion in favor of the insurance provider because it was
distinguishable on its facts,87 despite the rule that federal courts
applying state law should defer to intermediate appellate courts
when no high court decision has been made.88 The court found
that the Fuller rationale did not apply to the damage for which
B&V sought indemnification, because Aspen presented no evidence that B&V had sought to cut corners by accepting
excessively low subcontractor bids or by using inferior materials.89 The contractor in Fuller was not entitled to indemnification
because “a CGL policy covers damages only when they were
‘unexpected and unintentional,’ ”90 and Fuller’s attempt at “reckless cost-saving” so “increased the likelihood” of faulty subcontractor
work as to make it expected.91 In contrast, the court held that
B&V’s damages were accidental: while B&V may have taken a
“calculated risk” in hiring a subcontractor to manufacture the
internal parts, that risk alone simply did not amount to an
expectation or intention that the subcontractor’s work would be
faulty.92 Therefore, the faulty subcontractor work was an occurrence under the policy.
Moreover, the Black & Veatch Corp. court found that Fuller
did not even address “whether damages caused by a subcontractor are covered by a CGL policy that expressly provides coverage
for damages to an insured’s work arising from a subcontractor’s
faulty workmanship,” because the policy in Fuller did not include
a subcontractor exception.93 The policy in Fuller simply excluded
coverage for damage to the insured’s own work product, full stop,
“regardless of whether the contractor or its subcontractor caused
the damages.”94 Even if the damages at issue in Fuller had been
caused by an occurrence under the policy, they would have been
86

Id. at 965.
Id. at 968–69.
88
Id. at 967.
89
Id. at 968–69.
90
Id. at 962 (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 80 N.Y.2d 640, 649
(N.Y. 1993)).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 968.
94
Id.
87
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excluded from coverage by the “Your Work” exclusion. Therefore,
the court declined to extend Fuller’s holding to say that “the
damages at issue [in Black & Veatch Corp.] can never be an
occurrence.”95
III. USING A SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE
STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER A POLICYHOLDER
EXPECTED OR INTENDED FAULTY WORK
Because the definition of “occurrence” is contingent on there
being an accident that is not expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured, a relevant question is whether expectation or intention is a purely subjective standard. The court in
Black & Veatch Corp. applied a purely subjective standard,
relying heavily on arguments made by Professor Cristopher C.
French in an article regarding CGL coverage for defective work.96
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio applied a more objective
standard in Ohio Northern University, which was dispositive in
the court’s decision that faulty work is not a coverable
occurrence.
A.

The Subjective Standard Argued for by Professor Christopher
C. French

Professor French argues that defective work should be a
coverable occurrence, whether it is caused by a subcontractor or
the general contractor on a project.97 French’s argument goes a
95

Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 959–60 (citing French, supra note 9, at 107–08). The court’s analysis
of New York law seems to suggest that New York applies a purely subjective
standard. The court cited Continental Casualty Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 80
N.Y.2d 640, 649 (1993), for the proposition that CGL policies “are to be construed as
barring coverage ‘only when the insured intended the damages.’ ” Black & Veatch
Corp., 882 F.3d at 960 (emphasis omitted). The court went on to state that “[a]
policyholder might take a ‘calculated risk’—such as hiring a subcontractor—without
‘expecting’ damages to occur.” Id. at 962. Nonetheless, it would serve the New York
Court of Appeals well to clarify exactly whether the standard it applies is purely
subjective.
97
See French, supra note 9, at 143 (“[T]he inescapable conclusion is that construction defects are occurrences unless the insurer can prove the policyholder actually
expected or intended to do the construction work at issue defectively and expected or
intended that it would cause damage.”); see also Christian H. Robertson II, Note,
Defective Construction CGL Coverage: The Subcontractor Exception, 7 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 159, 174 (2017) (“French concludes that courts should
presume that all faulty workmanship—even that of the insured—constitutes an
occurrence covered, unless either the insurer proves otherwise or the policy
specifically excludes coverage.”).
96
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step further than the view adopted by the majority of state
courts, which only indemnify contractors for defective work performed by a subcontractor.98 French proposes a simple methodology
for analyzing CGL insurance policies: “[I]n most cases, whether
the damage associated with the defective workmanship is actually covered by CGL insurance should be determined based on an
analysis of whether any of the business risk exclusions apply.”99
French’s argument hinges on the notion that the standard
for determining whether faulty work is accidental should be
completely subjective, in the sense that insurers cannot deny
coverage unless they prove that the insured subjectively expected
or intended the damage.100 French argues that the subjective
standard is baked into the language of a standard form CGL
policy, which states that the injury or damage is excluded from
coverage if it was “expected or intended from the standpoint of
the insured.”101 The exclusion for expectation or intention neither
imposes a reasonableness standard nor a standard that relies on
probability or likelihood, but suggests a subjective standard focused on the insured party’s perspective.102 From there, French
makes the supposition that construction defects are rarely
expected or intended from the insured’s standpoint, whether they
can be attributed to the subcontractor’s work or not, and therefore they should not be categorically excluded from coverage.103
While many courts have applied a subjective standard, none
have gone as far as French. Most find that faulty work is an oc98

See Robertson, supra note 97.
French, supra note 9, at 144–45.
100
See id. at 115–17. French’s argument features two additional points that do
not merit discussion here, namely that: (1) state courts which find no occurrence
often rely on older cases like Weedo, which are outdated because they were decided
before the ISO instituted major changes in CGL insurance policies; and (2) the
“moral hazard” argument, which insurance companies employ to argue that CGL
coverage for the insured’s own faulty work lessens incentives for contractors to
reduce their probability of error, is weakened by other, more powerful incentives
that do not implicate insurance indemnification. Id. at 119, 141; see also Robertson,
supra note 97, at 172–74.
101
French, supra note 9, at 116.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 143 (“[T]he inescapable conclusion is that construction defects are
occurrences unless the insurer can prove the policyholder actually expected or
intended to do the construction work at issue defectively and expected or intended
that it would cause damage.”). French draws an analogy to car insurance, which
consumers purchase to indemnify themselves from the foreseeable result of their
own negligent driving, and poses the question: “If construction defect claims, the
most common claims asserted against contractors, were not covered by CGL insurance, then why would or should a contractor even buy CGL insurance?” Id. at 104.
99
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currence only when it was performed by a subcontractor and
decline to extend that holding to faulty work performed by the
insured. For example, in National Surety Corp. v. Westlake Investments, L.L.C., the Iowa Supreme Court held that a modern
CGL policy covered property damage arising out of defective
subcontractor work.104 The court reviewed a jury verdict that the
petitioners claimed was the result of improper jury instruction;
the trial judge had instructed the jury that “[d]efective construction work performed by an insured is not covered by the
policy; however, defective construction work performed by
subcontractors may be an ‘occurrence’ under the policy.”105 The
court held that the jury instruction was not improper because the
policy at issue contemplated coverage for defective subcontractor
work.106 The court applied a subjective standard for the same
reasons suggested by French: the policy provided coverage for an
accident “from the standpoint of the insured.”107 The court made
clear that the standard is purely subjective, finding that defective
subcontractor work would not be an accident only if it were the
“natural and expected result of the insured’s actions,” or “highly
probable whether the insured was negligent or not.”108
Likewise, in Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n v. Adria
Towers, L.L.C., the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a
subcontractor’s faulty work was an occurrence under a standard
form CGL policy.109 Like the court in National Surety, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey found that whether damages were an accident depended on whether they were expected or intended.110
104

880 N.W.2d 724, 740 (Iowa 2016) (“Accordingly, we interpret the insuring
agreement in the modern standard-form CGL policy as providing coverage for property damage arising out of defective work performed by an insured’s subcontractor
unless the resulting property damage is specifically precluded from coverage by an
exclusion or endorsement.”).
105
Id. at 734.
106
Id. at 736.
107
Id. (“Considered from the standpoint of the insured, ‘a deliberate act, performed negligently, is an accident if the effect is not the intended or expected result;
that is, the result would have been different had the deliberate act been performed
correctly.’ ” (quoting Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 8
(Tex. 2007))).
108
Id. The court cited United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc.,
642 N.W.2d 648, 652, 654 (Iowa 2002), as an example, in which the court concluded
that damage caused by the insured’s negligent supervision of their employee still
constituted an occurrence because the insured did not know its omission to act would
result in the harmful consequences. Nat’l Surety Corp., 880 N.W.2d at 735.
109
143 A.3d 273, 288 (N.J. 2016).
110
Id. at 287.
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However, unlike the court in National Surety, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey was less clear about whether that standard was
purely subjective. The court cited to Travelers Indemnity Co. of
America v. Moore & Associates, Inc., in which the Supreme Court
of Tennessee held that expectation or intention is determined
from the perspective of the insured,111 but the court concluded
that it needed to determine whether the “poor workmanship was
foreseeable.”112 The court’s appeal to foreseeability, without qualifying whether foreseeability is determined from the perspective
of the insured, suggests that it was not applying a subjective
standard as pure as that applied by the courts in National Surety
and Black & Veatch Corp.
Nonetheless, the court did not seem to rely on the foreseeability analysis in reaching the conclusion that the defective
work was an occurrence. Instead, the court rejected the insurance
company’s argument that the alleged damage resulting from
breach of contract could not give rise to a coverable occurrence.113
The court found that breach of contract claims were barred from
CGL coverage because of the business risk exclusions, not because such claims were not initially covered as an occurrence.114
B. Applying an Objective Standard for Determining Whether
Damages Are Accidental
One alternative to French’s subjective standard is to apply
an objective standard that determines whether faulty work damages are accidental based on the amount of control the contractor
had over the subcontractor’s work.115 In Westfield Insurance Co.
v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court of Ohio appeared
to forecast a control test by suggesting that the general contractor’s control over the process is relevant to coverage for faulty
work.116 While the court ultimately denied coverage for the
111

Id.; see Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302,
308 (Tenn. 2007).
112
Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, 143 A.3d at 287.
113
Id. at 287–88.
114
Id.
115
See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 97, at 189–90 (“First, courts should presume
CGL coverage for defective work performed by the insured’s subcontractor unless the
policy clearly excludes the specific coverage without exception; second, that presumption might be overcome if evidence shows that the insured had sufficient
control of the work that resulted in defective construction.” (emphasis omitted)).
116
133 Ohio St. 3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979 N.E.2d 269, at ¶ 13 (“The key
issues are whether the contractor controlled the process leading to the damages and
whether the damages were anticipated.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
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faulty work of a general contractor in that case, at least one
commentator debated whether the court would explicitly apply
the control test in a later case involving faulty subcontractor
work on the basis that subcontractor work cannot be controlled
by the general contractor.117
However, in October of 2018, the Supreme Court of Ohio
reached a final decision in Ohio Northern University, holding
that faulty subcontractor work is not a coverable occurrence
under standard form CGL policies because it “cannot be deemed
fortuitous.”118 Although the court was bound by their previous
decision in Custom Agri, it did not appear to interpret Custom
Agri as creating a control test; instead, it interpreted the earlier
case to hold that faulty work is not a coverable occurrence
because it is never fortuitous.119 The court then applied that
holding to the faulty subcontractor work at issue, and determined that faulty work is not a coverable occurrence whether it
is caused by a subcontractor or not, because it is not fortuitous.120
In essence, the court appeared to hold that even where a contractor has little to no control over the quality of its subcontractor’s
work, faulty work by a subcontractor is foreseeable enough to
never qualify as a coverable “occurrence.”
IV. WHETHER THE COST OF REPAIRING AND
REPLACING THE DEFECTIVE WORK ITSELF
IS COVERABLE PROPERTY DAMAGE
The majority of courts hold that the cost of repairing or
replacing defective work alone is not coverable property damage
under standard form CGL policies absent damage to other property.121 For example, in Capstone Building Corp. v. American
117

See Robertson, supra note 97, at 186–87.
Ohio N. Univ. v. Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 155 Ohio St. 3d 197, 2018-Ohio4057, 120 N.E.3d 762, at ¶ 3.
119
Id. ¶¶ 17–18 (noting that “[i]nherent in the plain meaning of ‘accident’ is the
doctrine of fortuity,” and “claims for faulty workmanship, such as the one in the
present case, are not fortuitous in the context of a CGL policy like the one here”
(quoting Custom Agri, 133 Ohio St. 3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712, 979 N.E.2d 269, at
¶¶ 13–14)).
120
Ohio N. Univ., 155 Ohio St. 3d 197, 2018-Ohio-4057, 120 N.E.3d 762, at ¶ 27.
121
French, supra note 9, at 128–29 (“Many courts have held that construction
defects can be occurrences, but only to the extent that property other than the
defective work itself was damaged. This is becoming the majority position of the
state supreme courts that have addressed the issue . . . .”). Note that, like the issue
as to whether faulty work is an “occurrence,” this issue is one of initial coverage—
the claimed damage may be initially coverable within the definition of property
118
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Motorists Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Connecticut held
that the cost of repairing and replacing defective work alone did
not constitute coverable property damage under a standard form
CGL policy.122 The plaintiffs sought indemnification for liabilities
incurred by water damage and other collateral damage to the
third party’s property, as well as “defective work, standing alone,
including building and fire safety code violations.”123 The court
found that the damage to the property not involved in the work
was coverable property damage, but declined to extend the
definition of property damage to the defective work alone.124
The court focused on the term “physical injury” in the definition of property damage, and concluded that the term
presupposed that the work was not defective or defectively
installed prior to delivery, but was injured after delivery or
installation by faulty work.125 Therefore, the court held that the
cost of repairing and replacing defective work was not coverable
property damage because the work was defective from its inception, rather than as a result of some physical injury that altered
the once-nondefective product.126
V. ARGUMENT
A.

Black & Veatch Corp. Correctly Distinguished Fuller

The Black & Veatch Corp. court correctly distinguished Fuller
on two distinct bases. First, the court placed appropriate emphasis on the fact that Fuller undertook bad faith cost-cutting, while

damage, but the particular policy at issue may ultimately exclude the property
damage from coverage in one of the business risk exclusions, such as the “Your
Work” exclusion. Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A.3d 961, 976
(Conn. 2013) (“Although a contractor’s work will often be excluded from coverage
pursuant to contractual exclusions in a commercial general liability policy, this distinction is not found in the plain language of the insuring agreement’s initial grant
of coverage.”).
122
67 A.3d at 969 (holding that “defective work standing alone or repairs to that
defective work do not constitute property damage and, therefore, are not covered
under the particular insurance policy in the present case”).
123
Id. at 976.
124
Id. at 979.
125
Id. at 980.
126
Id. at 982 (noting that “ ‘physical injury’ unambiguously connotes damage to
tangible property causing an alteration in appearance, shape, color or in other
material dimension” (quoting Traveler’s Ins. Co. v. Eljer Mfg., Inc., 757 N.E.2d 481,
502 (Ill. 2001))).
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Black & Veatch did not.127 Second, the court identified a provision
in the CGL policy at issue in Fuller that expressly excluded coverage for damages to the insured’s own work, whether that
damage resulted from an occurrence or not.128 The court correctly
found that the ISO no longer includes that provision in their CGL
policies, and that provision was absent from the policy at issue in
Black & Veatch Corp.129
1.

Fuller Involved Bad-Faith Cost Cutting

The Black & Veatch Corp. court correctly held that Fuller is
distinguishable because the contractor in that case undertook
bad faith cost-cutting. The Fuller court did not claim that faulty
work lacks the fortuity required to constitute an accident, as
other scholars and courts have claimed.130 Rather, the Fuller court
made clear that the particular faulty work at issue was not
fortuitous enough to constitute an occurrence because it resulted
from reckless cost-cutting measures.131 In other words, Fuller
was more than merely negligent for failing to expect faulty work
by its subcontractors; Fuller knew its subcontractors were
inferior but hired them anyway to save money.132 That fact was
enough to dissuade the Fuller court from ordering USF&G to
indemnify Fuller,133 even if Fuller did not expect or intend subcontractor error on a purely subjective level. In contrast, Aspen
did not allege any cost-cutting by Black & Veatch,134 let alone
recklessness. Black & Veatch had no reason to expect that their
subcontractor’s work would be faulty beyond the notion that
faulty work is always a remote possibility.

127
Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Ins. (U.K.) Ltd., 882 F.3d 952, 968–69 (10th
Cir. 2018).
128
Id. at 968.
129
Id. at 969, 971.
130
Compare PLITT ET AL., supra note 31, § 129:4 (collecting cases to support the
proposition that “[a] claim for faulty workmanship, in and of itself, is not an
occurrence under a commercial general liability policy because a failure of workmanship does not involve the fortuity required to constitute an accident”), with
George A. Fuller Co. v. U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 200 A.D.2d 255, 259 (1st Dep’t 1994)
(finding that the property damage resulted from “intentional cost-saving or
negligent acts”).
131
George A. Fuller Co., 200 A.D.2d at 259. Unfortunately, there are no trial
court documents to show precisely what those cost cutting measures were.
132
Id.
133
See id.
134
Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 968–69.
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Admittedly, the factual distinction would be much clearer if
the Fuller court had specified exactly what kind of cost-cutting
measures Fuller employed. Nonetheless, the Black & Veatch Corp.
court fairly posited that reckless cost-cutting is risky, bad-faith
behavior sufficiently culpable to stand in for expectation or intention, whereas subcontracting work on a large and complex piece
of machinery, without more, does not create an expectation or
intention that a subcontractor will perform faulty work.
2.

The Policy in Fuller Was Different from the Policy in Black
& Veatch Corp.

The Black & Veatch Corp. court was also correct in finding
that the CGL policy at issue in Fuller was markedly different
from the one in Black & Veatch Corp. The policy in Fuller barred
coverage via an exclusion that is no longer part of the standard
form policy issued by the ISO.135 Even if the Fuller court had decided that the damage at issue was caused by an occurrence
despite Fuller’s bad faith cost-cutting, the policy expressly
excluded coverage for damage caused to the insured’s own work.
In contrast, while the policy in Black & Veatch Corp. also excluded damage to the insured’s own work, it excepted from that
exclusion damage to the insured’s own work caused by the work
of a subcontractor.
Therefore, the Fuller court’s holding that the policy “d[id] not
insure against faulty workmanship in the work product itself but
rather faulty workmanship in the work product which create[d] a
legal liability by causing bodily injury or property damage to
something other than the work product”136 made sense only as
applied to that particular CGL policy. Modern CGL policies like
the one B&V purchased only exclude coverage for faulty work
performed by the insured general contractor, and not for faulty
work performed by their subcontractor.
Moreover, even under an outdated Fuller policy, the exclusion for faulty work has no bearing on whether faulty work is an
“occurrence” in the first place.137 That is decided only on the
basis of whether the resulting damages were expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured. If faulty work were
135

See discussion supra Part I.
George A. Fuller Co., 200 A.D.2d at 259.
137
See Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 958 (“[A] CGL policy starts with a
broad grant of coverage for damages arising from an ‘occurrence.’ Exclusions narrow
the scope of coverage.”).
136
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never an occurrence, it would not be necessary for the policy to
exclude it from the initial grant of coverage for occurrences that
cause property damage. As the court stated in Black & Veatch
Corp., “Fuller does not stand for the proposition that damages
caused by a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship can never constitute an ‘occurrence’ under a CGL policy.”138
The policy in Fuller was a completely different CGL policy
than either the policy in Black & Veatch Corp. or any modern
standard form CGL policy. Indeed, the Black & Veatch Corp. court
emphasized this fact, and found that Fuller relied on two
intermediate appellate court cases that were decided before the
ISO originated the subcontractor exception and expressly declared that it was intended to preserve coverage for property
damage caused by subcontractor work.139
Because Fuller is distinguishable, the New York Court of
Appeals would not contradict Appellate Division precedent by
holding that faulty subcontractor work is an occurrence under
standard form CGL policies. Therefore, New York’s legal environment is ripe for such a holding.
B. The New York Court of Appeals Should Apply a Purely
Subjective Standard
The New York Court of Appeals should apply a purely subjective standard to determine whether a contractor expected or
intended faulty work for three reasons. First, New York law does
not preclude the use of a subjective standard. Second, Professor
French’s approach to policy interpretation applying a purely
subjective standard best comports with the doctrines of insurance
policy interpretation. Third, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision
applying an objective standard is based on flawed precedent.
1.

New York Law Does Not Preclude a Subjective Standard

The court in Black & Veatch Corp. appeared to conclude that
New York law applies a purely subjective standard to determine
whether an accident was expected or intended.140 But Aspen did
138

Id. at 957.
Id. at 968; see also discussion supra Section II.B.1.
140
Black & Veatch Corp., 882 F.3d at 960 (“The New York Court of Appeals has
held that damages are accidental so long as they are ‘unexpected and unintentional.’
These terms are to be construed as barring coverage ‘only when the insured intended
the damages.’ The fact that an insured might have foreseen the possibility that its
subcontractor would build a defective product does not render the resulting damages
139
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not argue that B&V expected or intended the faulty subcontractor work, nor did B&V engage in bad faith cost-cutting like the
contractor in Fuller.141 Thus, the court did not have occasion to
rule on whether the standard is purely subjective. Nonetheless,
a future New York Court of Appeals decision could easily apply a
subjective standard to the definition of accident and determine
that subcontractor work is a coverable occurrence under standard form CGL policies, as the court did in National Surety
Corp.142 In fact, National Surety Corp.’s limit on coverage for instances where the resulting damage was highly probable, regardless of whether the contractor was negligent, coincides with
Fuller’s finding that bad-faith cost cutting estops the contractor
from later seeking coverage for faulty subcontractor work. Badfaith cost cutting is the very kind of behavior that makes
damages caused by faulty subcontractor work highly probable,
whether the general contractor adequately supervises the subcontractor or not.143
Additionally, the New York Court of Appeals can use the
same reasoning as the court in Cypress Point Condominium Ass’n
to cast aside the Fuller court’s notion that subcontractor error
results merely in an uncoverable breach of contract rather than a
coverable accident. The definition of “occurrence” does not distinguish between tort or breach of contract actions at least for the
purpose of initial coverage, notwithstanding any exclusions from
coverage later in the policy. Other courts have applied the same
reasoning.144

intentional . . . .” (citations omitted)). The court further maintained that a person
may engage in behavior that involves a calculated risk without expecting that an
accident will occur; “[i]n fact, people often seek insurance for just such
circumstances.” Id. at 962 (citation omitted).
141
Id. at 968.
142
880 N.W.2d 724, 740 (Iowa 2016).
143
In United Fire & Casualty Co., the case offered by the court in National
Surety Corp. for the proposition that negligent supervision does not create an expectation or intention of bodily injury without some affirmative act, the court found
that “the term ‘expected’ in such an exclusion denotes knowledge by the ‘actor’ that
certain consequences will flow from the intentional actions.” 642 N.W.2d 648, 653
(Iowa 2002). In a case such as Fuller, the contractor’s intentional act is cost cutting.
144
See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 884 (Fla. 2007)
(“[T]here is nothing in the basic coverage language of the current CGL policy to
support any definitive tort/contract line of demarcation for purposes of determining
whether a loss is covered by the CGL’s initial grant of coverage. ‘Occurrence’ is not
defined by reference to the legal category of the claim.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶ 41, 268 Wis. 2d 16,
673 N.W.2d 65)).
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French’s Approach to CGL Policy Interpretation Best
Comports with the Doctrines of Insurance Policy
Interpretation145 and Saves Litigation Costs

Ultimately, French’s argument in favor of assuming defective
work was accidental regardless of whether it was caused by the
work of a contractor or a subcontractor best comports with the doctrines of insurance policy interpretation: (1) contra proferentem,
(2) the reasonable expectations doctrine, and (3) construing the
policy as a whole.
First and most importantly, French’s approach makes the
most sense based on the language of the policy when it is read as
a whole. The very existence of the business risk exclusion for
damage to the insured’s own work—and the exception to that
exclusion for damage to the insured’s own work caused by faulty
subcontractor work—would be completely unnecessary if those
damages did not pass the threshold occurrence test to begin with.
To avoid rendering the business risk exclusions and their exceptions mere surplusage, those provisions must be given their
full effect.
Second, to the extent that the policy’s “accident” language is
ambiguous, the doctrine of contra proferentem supports finding
coverage in favor of the insured. Not only is the insurer in the
best position to avoid confusion over the extent of coverage
because it drafts the policy, but also the insurer can more easily
telegraph the limits of coverage by drafting them into the
business risk exclusions, rather than hoping that the courts will
interpret ambiguous terms like “occurrence” in its favor.
Third, construing CGL policies to indemnify contractors for
faulty subcontractor work better comports with the reasonable
expectations doctrine. Contractors purchasing CGL insurance
policies surely purchase them with the expectation that they will
be indemnified for liability incurred by accidental negligence,
which includes faulty subcontractor work. Otherwise, the CGL
policies would not have the risk-shifting effect sought by
contractors.
Finally, by assuming that faulty work was accidental and
moving directly to the business risk exclusions to determine if
there is coverage, French’s approach saves litigation costs otherwise spent on determining difficult fact issues like “objective
intent” or “sufficient control.” For these reasons, the New York
145

See discussion supra Sections II.A, III.A.
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Court of Appeals should conclude that faulty work is an “occurrence” for the purpose of standard form CGL policies, unless
the insurer can show intent or bad-faith cost cutting, and the
Court should look to the business risk exclusions to limit
coverage.
3.

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s Decision in Ohio Northern
University Is Based on Flawed Precedent

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Ohio Northern
University followed the precedent set in Custom Agri, a case in
which the court misinterpreted CGL policy language. There, the
court based its decision to apply the doctrine of fortuity when
analyzing CGL policies on language from a lower court decision.146 The court quoted JTO, Inc. v. State Automobile Mutual
Insurance Co. for the proposition that faulty work claims are not
covered unless they cause consequential damage, because faulty
work is not fortuitous, and coverage should instead be determined by analyzing the amount of control the contractor had over
the project and “whether the damages were anticipated.”147 The
quoted language went on to state that there is generally no
coverage for damages to the insured’s own work and that the
intent of the policies is to exclude coverage for business risks.148
The quoted language misinterpreted CGL policy language.
Claims for damages to the insured’s own work—rather than for
“consequential” damages to other property—caused by faulty
work are denied coverage because damage to the insured’s own
work is expressly excluded from coverage in the business risk
exclusions, and not because faulty work fails to pass the occurrence threshold. Indeed, for those policies to cover consequential
damages caused by faulty work, they would first need to conclude
that such faulty work was an accidental occurrence. Therefore,
the Supreme Court of Ohio should have overruled Custom Agri
because it was based on a flawed interpretation of CGL policy
language.

146
Westfield Ins. v. Custom Agri Sys., Inc., 133 Ohio St. 3d 476, 2012-Ohio-4712,
979 N.E.2d 269, at ¶ 13.
147
Id. (“The key issues are whether the contractor controlled the process leading
to the damages and whether the damages were anticipated.” (emphasis omitted)
(quoting JTO, Inc. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 194 Ohio App. 3d 319, 2011-Ohio1452, 956 N.E.2d 328, at ¶ 32)).
148
Id. (quoting JTO, Inc., 194 Ohio App. 3d 319, 2011-Ohio-1452, 956 N.E.2d
328, at ¶ 33).
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The Court also cited as persuasive the Kentucky Supreme
Court’s decision in Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Motorists Mutual
Insurance Co.,149 a decision that was “laden with errors and poor
reasoning.”150 There, the court seemed to contradict itself by concluding that even though an unintended loss is fortuitous, and it
is rare for a contractor to intend to damage their own work
product, defective workmanship is not an accidental occurrence.151 The court reasoned that the opposite holding would
cause CGL policies to become performance bonds by allowing any
claim of faulty workmanship to be a coverable occurrence unless
the insurer could prove the contractor’s error was intentional.152
As Professor French points out in his critique of the holding, that
is the very purpose of insurance policies—to indemnify the policy
holder for their unintentional negligence, regardless of their
fault.153 Therefore, Ohio Northern University relies on case law
which fundamentally misunderstands CGL insurance policies.
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision further reveals the perils
of applying objective standards like foreseeability or control to
CGL insurance policies: they virtually bar claims based on faulty
work, because contractors always have control over their own
work, and it is always foreseeable to some extent that faulty
work will lead to damages. In essence, a control test is impossible to implement while preserving any kind of coverage for faulty
work claims—even those for property damage to third-party
property. Such a holding is fatal to coverage under a policy that
contractors pay into with the specific intention of shifting the
risk of liability for their own negligence onto the insurer.
The Supreme Court of Ohio should have concluded that
faulty work passes the occurrence threshold unless it is subjectively expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured,
but that faulty work is excluded from coverage under the business risk exclusions unless the faulty work was performed by a
149
150
151

306 S.W.3d 69 (Ky. 2010).
French, supra note 9, at 138.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 74–75; see also French, supra note 9, at

139.
152
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d at 75; see also French, supra note 9, at 139
(“[T]he court then mistakenly concluded that construction defects cannot be occurrences because that would mean that any time construction work is unintentionally
done poorly by a subcontractor, and the defective work causes damage, there would
be coverage unless an exclusion in the policy otherwise eliminates coverage.”).
153
French, supra note 9, at 139 (arguing that “one of the primary reasons why
people and businesses buy insurance” is “to protect themselves against liability for
injuries unintentionally caused by their negligence”).
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subcontractor. This would have allowed the court to preserve the
overall result of its holding in Custom Agri by excluding the
general contractor’s faulty work from coverage based on the
business risk exclusions, rather than declaring that faulty work
can never pass the occurrence threshold. Then, the court could
have allowed coverage in Ohio Northern University because
subcontractor work is an exception to the “Your Work” exclusion.
C. The New York Court of Appeals Should Also Hold that the
Cost of Repairing and Replacing Faulty Work Is Coverable
“Property Damage” Under CGL Policies
The New York Court of Appeals should also hold that the
cost of repairing and replacing defective subcontractor work
meets the threshold for coverable “property damage” under CGL
policies. The Capstone Building Corp. court’s reasoning for precluding the defective work itself from coverage “neglects the ‘loss
of use’ language in the second definition of property damage.”154
Modern standard form CGL policies cover two kinds of property
damage: (1) “physical injury to tangible property, including all
resulting loss of use of that property,” and (2) “loss of use of
tangible property that is not physically injured.”155 The first loss
of use results from some physical injury and therefore requires
some physical alteration, as the court concluded in Capstone
Building Corp.
However, the second loss of use does not result from physical
injury and is therefore not contingent on some kind of physical
alteration. This second loss of use coverage can be thought to
cover any loss of use of property that results from the property
being defective at its inception. This scenario does not presuppose that the owner had been using the property before defective
subcontractor work rendered the property unusable by way of
physical injury. Instead, the owner had expected the property to
be usable and the property was unusable because of some defect,
such as the defective installation of some part before the property
was put into use. In other words, the defective work itself is the
coverable property damage. Therefore, if the property owner comes
after the insured for the costs they incurred repairing or replacing the defective work, or for the loss of income they incurred
waiting for the defective work to be repaired or replaced, the loss
154
155

Li, supra note 45, at 180–81.
Coverage Form (2013), supra note 16, at 565; see also supra Section I.A.
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of use coverage is intended to indemnify the insured for that
liability.
Like the issue of whether faulty work can be considered an
“occurrence,” whether the faulty work itself can be considered
“property damage” is a threshold for initial coverage that can be
limited by the business risk exclusions.156 Therefore, nothing
precludes the New York Court of Appeals from interpreting
“property damage” to encompass the defective work itself and
limiting coverage for such damages under the business risk
exclusions. Importantly, this would still retain coverage for the
cost of repairing and replacing defective work itself when the
work was done by a subcontractor.
Such a holding would better comport with the doctrines of
insurance policy interpretation. First, to the extent that the
“property damage” language is ambiguous, it should be construed
in favor of the insured under the doctrine of contra proferentum.
Second, if a contractor expects to be indemnified for faulty work
caused by a contractor because such faulty work is truly accidental, it makes sense that they would expect to be indemnified for
the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty work, which is no
less a part of the accident.157 Therefore, the reasonable expectations doctrine supports finding that the cost of repairing and
replacing the faulty work itself is covered under the policy.
Third, reading the policy as a whole, the cost of repairing and
replacing the faulty work itself is a matter of initial coverage so
long as the damages were not expected or intended; therefore, it
should only be excluded if the business risk exclusions so provide.
CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals should hold that faulty work
is an “occurrence” under standard form CGL policies. Unlike the

156

See French, supra note 9, at 105.
See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 885 (Fla. 2007) (“[W]e
reject a definition of ‘occurrence’ that renders damage to the insured’s own work as a
result of a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship expected, but renders damage to
property of a third party caused by the same faulty workmanship unexpected.”); see
also French, supra note 9, at 134 (“In sum, the courts holding defective work itself
cannot be viewed as property damage have not offered a satisfying explanation why
non-defective work that has been damaged and needs to be repaired or replaced because of defective workmanship constitutes property damage but the defective work
itself that also needs to be repaired or replaced does not constitute property damage.
In both instances, the property is unusable or damaged in its current state.”).
157
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Supreme Court of Ohio, the New York Court of Appeals is not
bound by past precedent to preclude liability for damages caused
by faulty work from coverage under standard form CGL policies.
As to the scope of coverage, the New York Court of Appeals
should construe the term “accident” as wholly subjective and find
that faulty work is an occurrence so long as it is not expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured. The Court should
then conclude that the business risk exclusions limit this broader
form of initial coverage for “occurrences,” and that the “Your
Work” exclusion in particular limits such coverage for damages to
the insured’s own work caused by faulty work unless that faulty
work was performed by a subcontractor. Finally, the Court
should conclude that the cost of repairing and replacing the
faulty work itself falls within the definition of “property damage”
under standard form CGL policies. Like the business risk exclusions, the Court should make clear that insurers and policy
holders are free to negotiate an exclusion that limits coverage for
the cost of repairing and replacing the faulty work itself, whether
or not it causes damage to other property, but that such damages
are not precluded from initial coverage under the policy.

